Buscicchi – In the Mood for Hedonic Phenomenalism
The next meeting of the seminar „Philosophy of Cognitive Science” is planned for December, 2nd, at 10:00 (AM Warsaw, CET). Our guest will be Lorenzo Buscicchi (University of Waikato). We will discuss a draft paper: In the Mood for Hedonic Phenomenalism.
Abstract: The present paper addresses the debate between hedonic phenomenalism and hedonic intentionalism, the two main theories of pleasure. More specifically, this paper advances an objection to hedonic intentionalism, the cheerfulness objection. Following it, the mood of cheerfulness lacks intentionality. If it is not the case that every pleasure is intentional, it follows that we cannot group pleasures together through a shared attitude. The globalist strategy—the most prominent move advanced to save the intentionality of moods—is rejected. This strategy seems phenomenologically implausible: it simply does not seem to respect our experience of cheerfulness. Thus, cheerfulness ends up being a damaging counter-example to hedonic intentionalism. Given that, I advance that hedonic phenomenalism is still the most plausible account of pleasure.
To receive the Zoom link, please contact Dr. Przemysław Nowakowski (email@example.com)