Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

About the Project

The aim of this project was to investigate how cognitive science can be unified and integrated despite its interdisciplinary nature. Cognitive science is a field that uses methods, tools, and concepts from multiple disciplines, leading to concerns about whether it is a cohesive field or a patchwork of disconnected research. Our hypothesis was that diversity can actually enhance interdisciplinary research, and that integration can be achieved by making scientific representations coherent through mechanistic explanations. Unification, on the other hand, is more challenging, requiring broad scope, simplicity, systematicity, and homogeneity.

To test our hypothesis, we examined explanatory models and frameworks in cognitive science, including embodied cognition and predictive processing. While these are not grand unifying theories, they offer guidance towards developing such theories. We analyzed actual scientific practice and drew upon the history of cognitive science to account for the heuristic value of different explanatory strategies.

Our interdisciplinary team, which included philosophers, cognitive psychologists, and clinical psychologists, used a new mechanism in philosophy of science to investigate these issues. By developing a descriptively adequate account of integration and unification, we were able to justify normative principles for successful interdisciplinary collaboration and explanatory unification.

This work has significant implications for the development of cognitive science. Achieving its full potential requires a deeper understanding among researchers with different theoretical and methodological backgrounds. Otherwise, cognitive science may become fragmented and siloed. By promoting integration and unification, we can ensure that cognitive science remains a cohesive and thriving field.

The full description of the research project is available in the PDF format here: Integration and unification.

Publications of the project

Bielecka, K., & Marcinów, M.. (2017). Mental Misrepresentation in Non-Human Psychopathology. Biosemiotics 10(2), 195-210. doi:10.1007/s12304-017-9299-2.
Bielecka, K., & Miłkowski, M. (2018). Marksołak a rzeczywistość. In S. Gromadzki & M. Miłkowski (Eds.), Leszek Kołakowski a filozofia (pp. 75–95). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
Bielecka, K., & Miłkowski, M. (2020). Error Detection and Representational Mechanisms. In J. Smortchkova, K. Dołęga, & T. Schlicht (Eds.), What are Mental Representations? (pp. 287–313). New York: Oxford University Press.
Fresco, N., & Miłkowski, M. (2019). Mechanistic Computational Individuation without Biting the Bullet. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz005
Gładziejewski, P., & Miłkowski, M. (2017). Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors. Biology & Philosophy, 32, 337–355. doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6
Hensel, W. M., Miłkowski, M., & Nowakowski, P. (2022). Without more theory, psychology will be a headless rider. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, e20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21000212
Hohol, M., & Miłkowski, M. (2019). Cognitive Artifacts for Geometric Reasoning. Foundations of Science, 24(4), 657–680. doi:10.1007/s10699-019-09603-w
Litwin, P. (2020). Extending Bayesian Models of the Rubber Hand Illusion. Multisensory Research, 33(2), 127–160. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134808-20191440
Litwin, P., & Miłkowski, M. (2020). Prospection does not imply predictive processing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, e137. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X19002991
Litwin, P., & Miłkowski, M. (2020). Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing. Cognitive Science, 44(7), e12867. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12867
Litwin, P., Zybura, B., & Motyka, P. (2020). Tactile information counteracts the attenuation of rubber hand illusion attributable to increased visuo-proprioceptive divergence. PLOS ONE, 15(12), e0244594. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244594
Marcinów, M. (2020). Methodology of ‘History of Polish Madness.’ AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard, 11(1). doi: 10.26913/avant.2020.01.07
Matyja, J. R. (2016). Embodied Music Cognition: Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind. Frontiers in Psychology, 7. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01891
Matyja, J. R., & Dolega, K. (2015). Commentary: The embodied brain: towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00669
Miłkowski, M. (2016a). Integrating cognitive (neuro)science using mechanisms. Avant: Journal of Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard, VI(2), 45–67.
Miłkowski, M. (2016b). Sztuczna inteligencja. In J. Hołówka & B. Dziobkowski (Eds.), Panorama współczesnej filozofii (pp. 309–328). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Miłkowski, M. (2016c). Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 48(1), 13–33. doi:10.1515/slgr-2016-0053
Miłkowski, M. (2016d). Kognitywistyka i modele umysłu. dwutygodnik.com. Warszawa. http://www.dwutygodnik.com/artykul/6322-kognitywistyka-i-modele-umyslu.html. Accessed 26 February 2017
Miłkowski, M. (2017a). Situatedness and Embodiment of Computational Systems. Entropy, 19(4), 162. doi:10.3390/e19040162
Miłkowski, M. (2017b). Why think that the brain is not a computer? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 16(2), 22–28.
Miłkowski, M. (2017c). Is Empiricism Empirically False? Lessons from Early Nervous Systems. Biosemiotics, 10(2), 229–245. doi:10.1007/s12304-017-9294-7.
Miłkowski, M. (2017d) Objections to Computationalism. A Survey. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Computational Foundations of Cognition, 2723–28. London: Cognitive Science Society, 2017. https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2017/papers/0515/index.html.
Miłkowski, M. (2017e). Mechanisms and the Mental. In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart S Glennan and Phyllis Illari, 74–88. New York: Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), 2017.
Miłkowski, M. (2017f). Powszechniki kontratakują. Uwagi o tezie wielorakiej realizacji życia Krzysztofa Chodasewicza. Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 12(4), 81–95.
Miłkowski, M. (2018a). Autopoiesis nie wywołała rewolucji. In G. Króliczak, K. Łastowski, Ł. Przybylski, P. Przybysz, & M. Urbański (Eds.), Filozof w krainie umysłów. Profesorowi Andrzejowi Klawiterowi w darze (pp. 217–227). Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Społecznych UAM.
Miłkowski, M. (2018b). From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism. Minds and Machines, 28(3), 515–541. doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9468-3
Miłkowski, M. (2018c). Objections to Computationalism: A Survey. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 66(3), 57–75. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-3
Miłkowski, M. (2018d). “Morphological Computation: Nothing but Physical Computation.” Entropy 20 (12): 942. https://doi.org/10.3390/e20120942.
Miłkowski, M. (2018e). Embodied Cognition Meets Multiple Realizability. Reti, saperi, linguaggi, (2), 349–364. https://doi.org/10.12832/92305
Miłkowski, M. (2019a). Embodied cognition. In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind (pp. 323–338). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315643670-25
Miłkowski, M. (2019b). Fallible Heuristics and Evaluation of Research Traditions. The Case of Embodied Cognition. Ruch Filozoficzny, 75(2), 223–236. doi:10.12775/RF.2019.031
Miłkowski, M. (2019c). Social intelligence: How to integrate research? A mechanistic perspective. AI & SOCIETY, 34(4), 735–744. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-017-0787-3
Miłkowski, M. (2020). Thinking about Semantic Information. Avant, XI(2), 1–10. doi: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.08
Miłkowski, M. (2021). Correspondence Theory of Semantic Information. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/714804
Miłkowski, M., & Hohol, M. (2021). Synthese: Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism, 199(Supplement Issue 1), S1-S219. https://link.springer.com/journal/11229/volumes-and-issues/199-1/supplement.
Miłkowski, M., & Hohol, M. (2021). Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism. Synthese, 199, S1–S17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02777-y
Miłkowski, M., Hohol, M., Nowakowski, P. (Eds.) (2019), Mechanisms in psychology: The road towards unity? Theory & Psychology, 29(5), 567–735.
Miłkowski, M., Hohol, M. Nowakowski, P. (2019). Mechanisms in psychology: The road towards unity?. Theory & Psychology, 29(5), 567–578 https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319875218
Miłkowski, M., Hensel, W. M., & Hohol, M. (2018). Replicability or reproducibility? On the replication crisis in computational neuroscience and sharing only relevant detail. Journal of Computational Neuroscience. doi:10.1007/s10827-018-0702-z
Miłkowski, Marcin, Robert William Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska, Aleksandra Przegalińska, Tadeusz Zawidzki, Adam Gies, Joel Krueger, et al. 2018. “From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution.” Frontiers in Psychology 9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02393.
Miłkowski, M., & Nowakowski, P. (2019). Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective? Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02445-w
Miłkowski, M., & Litwin, P. (2022). Testable or bust: theoretical lessons for predictive processing. Synthese, 200(6), 462. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03891-9
Miłkowski, M., & Litwin, P. (2022). Testable or bust: theoretical lessons for predictive processing. Synthese, 200(6), 462. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03891-9
Motyka, P., & Litwin, P. (2019). Proprioceptive Precision and Degree of Visuo-Proprioceptive Discrepancy Do Not Influence the Strength of the Rubber Hand Illusion. Perception, 48(9), 882–891. https://doi.org/10.1177/0301006619865189
Nowakowski, P. R. (2017). Embodied Cognition: Looking Inward. Hybris, (38), 74–97.
Nowakowski, P. R. (2019). Epistemic Challenges: Engaging Philosophically in Cognitive Science. Ruch Filozoficzny, 75(2), 237–255. https://doi.org/10.12775/RF.2019.032
Nowakowski, P. R. (2020). Tracking the Objects of the Psychopathology. AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard, XI(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.01.05
Smurzyńska, A. (2022). Misidentification delusions as mentalization disorders. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09820-y
Wachowski, W. (2019). 30 lat Dizajnu na co dzień. Komentarz i recenzja przekładu książki Dona Normana. AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard. doi: 10.26913/avant.2019.03.23
Wachowski, W. (2020). Podane dalej. Inna książka o dizajnie. AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard, 11(3). https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.03.43
Wachowski, W. M. (2019). What it is like to be a pickpocket. Culture & Psychology, 1354067X1989493. doi: 10.1177/1354067X19894934
Wołoszyn, K., & Hohol, M. (2017). Commentary: The poverty of embodied cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00845

The project was funded by National Science Center under the decision DEC-2014/14/E/HS1/00803 in May 2015 for 1548000.00 PLN. The duration of the project was 5 years. The Principal Investigator was Marcin Miłkowski.