Filozofia Kognitywistyki

W imieniu prof. Marcina Miłkowskiego serdecznie zapraszamy na kolejne posiedzenie ogólnopolskiego Seminarium Filozofia Kognitywistyki IFiS PAN, które odbędzie się dnia 14 stycznia 2020 (wtorek) w Pałacu Staszica (ul. Nowy Świat 72, Warszawa) w sali 161 o godz. 12.00.

Tym razem w ramach seminarium wysłuchamy dwóch wystąpień. Pierwszy wystąpi Carlos Zednik (Uniwersytet w Magdeburgu) z referatem zatytułowanym: 25 years after Mind as Motion: What is left of the dynamical revolution?

Abstrakt referatu:

In 1995, Port and van Gelder’s Mind as Motion jump-started the dynamical systems approach in cognitive science. After much discussion in the early years, the hype has waned somewhat. Nevertheless, the dynamical systems approach has far from disappeared. In this talk, I will reconsider some of the initial, revolutionary aspirations, and evaluate what is left 25 years later. On the one hand, I will consider van Gelder’s “nature hypothesis”, and address issues such as time-sensitivity, decomposability, and situatedness. On the other hand, I will consider van Gelder’s “knowledge hypothesis”, and consider the way tools and concepts from dynamical systems theory are used in cognitive science today.

Powyższemu wystąpieniu towarzyszył będzie referat Marka Pokropskiego (UW) i Piotra Litwina (UW) zatytułowany: Neurophenomenology and Dynamic Modelling

Abstrakt referatu:

Neurophenomenology was thought to deliver a methodological way to study mental phenomena. In this approach dynamic modelling of experience and underlying neural activity was of key importance. In the paper we discuss several examples of neurophenomenological research and argue that neurophenomenology failed to deliver what it promised, namely the dynamic model of studied experience. Then, we consider whether neurophenomenological descriptions and analyses of experiential dynamics could play an informative role in the integrative dynamic-mechanistic model of explanation.